Retired general Dorin Toma, commander of NATO’s Multinational Division South-East from 2022 to 2025, argues that Bucharest’s talk of Romania as a security, energy or logistics hub for Ukraine is poorly matched by decisions inside government. He says Romania risks remaining a supplier of logistics routes with few economic returns.
Toma says Romania has long been described as an energy hub even though Black Sea gas production has not started, and that discussion of the vertical corridor has been cautious. He recalls that last summer the country imported electricity from wherever it could, with the prospect of a blackout each evening.
In his view, Ukraine’s reconstruction has already begun and is likely to last a generation. He describes it as covering infrastructure, the restart of economic activity, industrial change, modernisation of the state and reintegration of the population, beyond repair of buildings, roads and bridges damaged by the war. He says Kyiv has invited Romania to take part without hesitation.
One mechanism Ukrainian authorities are promoting is regional patronage, under which partner states support the reconstruction of particular communities, cities and regions. Toma says several European states have already formed such partnerships with Ukrainian local authorities, while others are interested in the economic cooperation, and that the mechanism’s potential is still underused. A territorial partnership, he argues, could build lasting contacts with local administrations, a clearer view of community needs and earlier involvement in preparing projects, which could ease economic participation and contract awards.
He adds that reconstruction also has a geopolitical side. Geography can make Romania logistically indispensable for rebuilding the neighbouring country, while turning that position into investment, industrial capacity and economic influence depends on the instruments the state creates. Competition among European, American, Ukrainian and other companies for a role in the work has already started, he says, and Romania faces a choice between supplying services and routes or becoming an economic actor in transport, ports, energy, building materials, the defence industry and logistics.
Toma says that in September 2024 Ukraine formally asked Romania to examine patronage over reconstruction of one war-affected Ukrainian region and sought concrete participation by Romanian companies. The previous government said it backed local and regional partnerships, yet no concrete progress on a patronage arrangement was made public, and he sees no sign that the interministerial group set up last year worked consistently or effectively. He says new governments in Romania often restart files from the beginning, so results are delayed.
The new government also intends to name an official responsible for Ukraine’s reconstruction and to form another interministerial group. In May 2026 Romania took part in the International Summit of Cities and Regions of Ukraine. Afterwards, 22 agreements and memorandums were announced, involving ten Ukrainian regions and partners from eleven countries. The Republic of Moldova was among those partners. Romania does not appear among the signatories and, Toma says, continues to analyse the issue. He considers slow decision-making a more likely explanation than a settled strategic choice or financial or security limits, though the reasons have not been set out by the authorities in Bucharest.
He says regional patronage can require multi-year funding, specialist staff, permanent relations with the Ukrainian administration and acceptance of security risks. Results, in his view, would be shown by how much money was actually mobilised, how many Romanian companies received support and what value of contracts was obtained. He concludes that, until then, a concrete chance for Romania to take part in Ukraine’s reconstruction remains unused.